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Kevin Curran
Shakespeare and Judgment. It’s a simple enough proposition. 
“Shakespeare” and “judgment”: two keywords, both fairly recog-
nizable, each offering a context for the other. And yet the title of this 
book immediately raises some questions. First of all, what exactly is 
“judgment”? Is it an act or a process? A concept or an experience? 
To which cultural or theoretical fi eld does it belong, and to what 
set of social practices? Also – and perhaps most importantly – what 
does it have to do with Shakespeare? Given how many items have 
appeared on the other side of the “Shakespeare and” formulation – 
from religion, law, appropriation, the book trade, and national 
culture to masculinity, republicanism, Ovid, music, and language – 
what justifi es adding yet another? What, that is, does judgment offer 
Shakespeare studies as a category of critical inquiry? This introduc-
tion will begin to provide some answers to these questions, setting 
the scene for the more specifi c projects that follow. Grounding the 
volume are two core contentions: (1) that attending to Shakespeare’s 
treatment of judgment leads to fresh insights about the imaginative 
relationship between theater, law, religion, and aesthetics in early 
modern England; and (2) that judgment offers new ways of putting 
the historical and philosophical contexts of Shakespeare’s plays into 
conversation. 
This is a new undertaking, the fi rst attempt to articulate the central 
place of Shakespearean drama in the cultural and intellectual history of 
judgment. That said, the volume builds on a number of earlier studies. 
Richard Strier, for instance, discusses what he views as Shakespeare’s 
skepticism about moral judgment in chapter three of The Unrepentant 
Renaissance: From Petrarch to Shakespeare to Milton, and returns to 
the idea in an essay called “Shakespeare and Legal Systems: The Better 
the Worse (but Not Vice Versa).”1 Julia Reinhard Lupton explores the 
idea of judgment at a number of points in Thinking with Shakespeare: 
Essays on Politics and Life, especially in a chapter devoted to The 
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Winter’s Tale which draws compelling parallels between Shakespeare’s 
and Hannah Arendt’s conceptions of judgment. Lupton extends this 
line of thought in a more recent essay dealing with the relationship 
between judgment and forgiveness in The Winter’s Tale.2 Judgment 
is also discussed at various points in Lorna Hutson’s seminal study of 
theater and law in early modern England, The Invention of Suspicion: 
Law and Mimesis in Shakespeare and Renaissance Drama.3 Hutson is 
primarily interested in the perception and practice of judgment within 
English common law, but she also examines the way ideas about legal 
judgment are connected to discourses of religion and civility in early 
modern England. The place of judgment within rhetorical theory has 
been addressed by Kathy Eden in Poetic and Legal Fiction in the Aristo-
telian Tradition, Joel Altman in The Improbability of Othello: Rhetor-
ical Anthropology and Shakespearean Selfhood, and Quentin Skinner 
in Forensic Shakespeare.4 Paul Yachnin’s chapter on “The Theater of 
Judgment” in his forthcoming book, Making Publics in Shakespeare’s 
Playhouse, will constitute yet another signifi cant contribution to this 
growing body of scholarship.5 Related work that deals with judgment 
beyond the historical parameters of early modernity includes, most 
importantly, Vivasvan Soni’s special issue of The Eighteenth Century 
on “The Crisis of Judgment” and Thomas Pfau’s wide-ranging inquiry 
into the roots of modernity, Minding the Modern: Human Agency, 
Intellectual Traditions, and Responsible Knowledge, which takes up 
judgment – along with will, personhood, and action – as one of the 
foundational concepts in Western intellectual history.6
As the notes to the chapters that follow indicate, Shakespeare 
and Judgment is in close conversation with these studies. Taken as 
a whole, though, the volume also offers something quite distinct: 
the fi rst sustained consideration of the way judgment, in its various 
cultural and conceptual formations, shapes and is shaped by Shake-
speare’s language and dramaturgy. Such a project stands to reinvigo-
rate our understanding of the imaginative and cultural geography 
of Shakespeare’s plays, since judgment was, and remains, a point 
of intersection for a wide variety of social practices and intellectual 
traditions. Conversely, the plays themselves help us map out judg-
ment’s assemblage-like structure across the sprawled thought-worlds 
of law, religion, aesthetics, rhetoric, and philosophy. Shakespeare, 
of course, was not the only early modern dramatist to engage with 
judgment. Ben Jonson, for example, deals with it quite regularly. 
But Shakespeare’s plays offer a richer, more wide-ranging account of 
what judgment is and what judgment can make possible (politically, 
ethically, and socially) than any of his contemporaries.
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What is Judgment?
Judgment is something out there – in the law courts, in the universi-
ties, on the tip of God’s tongue, and in the codes of socialization. But 
it’s also something in here. Judgment is a psychological faculty pos-
sessed by each person, even if its effectiveness may vary depending 
on circumstance and other factors. Early modern scholars such as 
Pierre de la Primaudaye, Thomas Wright, Philippe de Mornay, and 
others describe the capacity to judge as part of a complex ecology of 
cognitive and sensory aptitudes. Memory, for example, as Garrett 
Sullivan has shown, was thought of as crucial to judgment, provid-
ing a storehouse of experience-based data on which future decisions 
could be based.7 Emotion, on the other hand, conceived of in physi-
ological terms and referred to as “passions,” impeded judgment. In 
Passions of the Minde (1601), Thomas Wright explains,
Those actions then which are common with us, and the beasts, we cal 
Passions, and Affections, or perturbances of the mind . . . They are called 
Passions (although indeed they be acts the sensitive power, or faculties 
of our soul . . .) because when these affections are stirring in our minds, 
they alter the humours of our bodies, causing some passion or alteration 
in them. They are called perturbations, for that . . . they trouble wonder-
fully the soule, corrupting the judgment, & seducing the will . . .8
Similarly, Philippe de Mornay in The True Knowledge of a Man’s 
Owne Selfe (1602) instructs that “The knowledge of a mans owne 
selfe, availeth, not onely for preservations of the bodies health, but 
likewise to moderate the vehemcie of inordinate affections, which 
hinder and impeach the health of judgment.”9 
According to these writers, judgment is rational and practical, 
and in this sense quite opposed to the operations of the body. But 
this was not the only version of judgment made available by early 
modern faculty psychology. As David Summers has demonstrated, 
there is also “a long tradition of speculation concerning prerational 
sensate judgment upon which Renaissance writers drew.”10 Aristotle, 
for example, argued that the capacity to judge was common to both 
thought and perception. “Each sense,” he writes, “judges the specifi c 
differences of its own sensible object . . . Sight produces upon white 
and black, taste upon sweet and bitter, and so with the rest.”11 Later, 
we fi nd the English scholar Abraham Fraunce advancing a similar 
line about the relationship between judgment and sensation in The 
Lawyers Logike (1588):
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For as Aristotle teacheth in the second of his demonstrations, every 
sensible creature hath a naturall power and facultie of judging, which 
is called sence; & this sence (2. Topic) is of him sayde to bee a certayne 
kinde of judgement: and without doubt, the sence is a most upright 
judge of suche thinges as are properly under his jurisdiction, as 
the sight of colours, the hearing of soundes, the smelling of smelles 
(4. Metap).12 
For Thomas Wright and Phillipe de Mornay, judgment is something 
that distinguishes humans from animals because it is a property of rea-
son rather than sensation. For Fraunce, following Aristotle, however, 
judgment is common to “every sensible creature” because sensation 
constitutes a “certayne kinde of judgment.” 
It is the latter tradition that Shakespeare has in mind when Hamlet 
confronts his mother with portraits of her old husband, Hamlet Sr., 
and her new husband, Claudius:
This was your husband. Look you now what follows:
Here is your husband, like a mildewed ear,
Blasting his wholesome brother. Have you eyes?
Could you on this fair mountain leave to feed,
And batten on this moor? ha, have you eyes?
You cannot call it love, for at your age
The heyday in the blood is tame, it’s humble,
And waits upon the judgment, and what judgment
Would step from this to this?
. . .
Eyes without feeling, feeling without sight,
Ears without hands or eyes, smelling sans all,
Or but a sickly part of one true sense
Could not so mope. (3.4.63–71, 78–81)13
In the course of Hamlet’s withering rebuke, judgment emerges as a 
species of spectatorship (“have you eyes?”). Good judgment, it seems, 
involves a clear alignment of perception and emotion while bad judg-
ment (Gertrude’s judgment) results from a misalignment of percep-
tion and emotion: “Eyes without feeling, feeling without sight.”14
Faculty psychology underpinned much of the discourse on self-
hood in early modern England, but the context in which most of 
Shakespeare’s contemporaries would have encountered judgment 
was, in fact, the study of rhetoric. Roman rhetorical theory was 
central to the humanist curriculum in Tudor grammar schools. The 
Rhetorica ad Herennium, Cicero’s De inventione, and Quintilian’s 
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Institutio oratoria were used as textbooks, offering students training 
in the kind of analytical and pragmatic method of argumentation 
central to what Aristotle called the genus iudiciale, or legal speech.15 
This involved the carefully synchronized deployment of two skills: 
invention and judgment. Invention is the process of choosing the 
ideas and subjects most likely to persuade your audience while judg-
ment is the process of ordering and deploying those ideas in a way 
designed to achieve maximum effect. In this context, judgment is 
best understood as “a faculty of form and structure, arranging the 
matter of invention by deciding which type of argument to use and 
how to compose a total sequence.”16 This formal dimension of judg-
ment is noteworthy as it lies behind much of the vernacular literary 
criticism that emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Pro-
grammatic descriptions of good writing and right reading by fi gures 
such as Philip Sidney, George Puttenham, Samuel Daniel, and Henry 
Peacham cite judgment as both the faculty responsible for proper 
discernment and the attribute that stands to benefi t from superior 
writing and oratory. The easiest way to identify fi rst-rate poetry, so 
the argument runs, is to assess its level of decorum, the quality of 
adhering to formal rules of concurrence among genre, plot, charac-
ter, and language. Decorum was the gold standard of aesthetic qual-
ity for early modern literary critics and it was understood primarily 
as an expression of sound judgment.
If the genus iudiciale relied on a practical and evaluative version 
of judgment native to both humanist pedagogy and literary criticism, 
the term itself also reminds us that judgment found its primary insti-
tutional home in the law courts. In the case of legal pleas it took a 
form consistent with the requirements of humanist oratory. A plea, 
that is, involved both choosing and effectively arranging arguments. 
At the same time, judges, juries, and Justices of the Peace practiced 
judgment not just in the sense of handing down decisions, but also 
in the sense of using specifi c criteria to measure the quality and 
persuasiveness of legal arguments. In this respect, judges engage in a 
practice very similar to literary critics, a correspondence that Kathy 
Eden traces back to Aristotle:
The rapport between poetry and law, so fundamental to the Aristotelian 
literary tradition, is not only preserved but enriched. For, in an attempt 
to chart, for the fi rst time, the invisible workings of psychological judg-
ment, Aristotle turns . . . to the familiar procedures of legal judgment. 
And this capacity for judging, in turn, is intimately linked in the human 
soul to the act of imagining, so crucial to both rhetoric and poetry.17 
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For the judge as for the poet or dramatist, judgment is a method. It is 
a procedure designed for measurement and assessment, for breaking 
things down into their component parts so as to evaluate them more 
effectively and understand them more accurately. 
The Renaissance represents a particularly important passage in the 
professional and institutional history of legal judgment. The period 
saw a gradual shift in emphasis from legal doctrine to judge-made 
law, or jurisprudence, which meant that the role of judgment – of 
judicial decision-making – in creating the law expanded signifi cantly.18 
Whereas in the fi fteenth century, Thomas Littleton’s landmark 
Tenures (1481) relied almost exclusively on doctrine, or common 
learning, Sir William Staunford, holding the same judicial offi ce as 
Littleton less than a century later, wrote, in J. H. Baker’s words, 
“books so crammed with references and quotations that he seemed 
incapable of venturing an opinion unless it could be derived from 
someone else.”19 Staunford, in other words, in books like Les plees 
del coron (1557) and An exposicion of the kinges prerogative (1561), 
drew heavily on past judicial decisions to lend his own claims author-
ity. Edmund Plowden’s later sixteenth-century law reports exhibit the 
same tendency, but with more methodological rigor and decisiveness. 
Plowden was very selective when it came to choosing which cases to 
report. Unlike more typical yearbooks of the period, he would leave 
out any courtroom debate that was inconclusive, publishing only 
those cases in which a specifi c point of law had been settled by a 
fi nal judgment of record.20 These shifts are indicative of a mounting 
desire among legal professionals and their clientele for law to rest 
upon clearly recorded facts. It resulted, gradually, in a more authori-
tative judiciary and judgment came to loom larger in the conceptual 
landscape of English common law.21
Despite the steadily growing importance of judgment – or perhaps 
because of it – there was also anxiety about the methods and effects 
of meting it out. Some of these anxieties were religious. Writings on 
the sacrament of penance, for example, frequently presented secular 
judgment as demonic, both severely formal and dangerously fallible 
in comparison with the equitable and restorative principles of the 
Church.22 One such text is Jacob’s Well (c.1450), a sequence of peni-
tential sermons composed for oral delivery between Ash Wednesday 
and the Vigil of Pentecost, now widely recognized as an early source 
for the morality play Mankind (c.1465).23 Each sermon fi ts into a 
larger allegorical scheme in which the soul struggles out of a pit 
of corrupt waters into the pure well of Jacob, assisted by various 
tools that represent contrition, confession, and satisfaction. The aim 
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of these sermons was to urge parishioners to make confession and 
embrace the Church’s penitential system for managing and purging 
sin. The diabolical alternative is the secular common law courts in 
which “thou schuldst be convict in thi cause, for thou art gylty in 
wrong . . . and the sentens of dampnacyoun shulde be gouyn agens 
the.” Better to go “to the juge of god, that is, to the preest.”24 Whereas 
God’s justice offers a shot at redemption, the infl exible justice of the 
common law courts leads directly to death and damnation. Hutson 
explains that in Jacob’s Well, “jury trial emerges as no kind of trial at 
all, and salvation is imagined as a repeated escape from the rigors of 
Common Law Hell, fi rst by the priestly judge’s absolution, and then 
by Purgatorial pains, fi gured as our escape, by pleading clergy, to the 
canonical purgation of the spiritual courts.”25 
The attitude toward secular judgment in Jacob’s Well is indicative 
of a deeply entrenched habit of thought, a core distrust of secular 
law that persisted even despite the momentous shift in jurisdictional 
authority from spiritual to temporal institutions over the course of 
the sixteenth century. As late as 1578, Thomas Garter’s dramatic 
interlude, The Commody of the most virtuous and Godlye Susanna, 
portrays a miscarriage of justice in a secular court set right at the last 
moment by divine intervention. Here, the concern is less with the dia-
bolically stringent, either/or conditions of common law courts than it 
is with the basic competence of human judges, fallen and imperfect 
as they are, to identify truth and arbitrate accordingly. The Judge 
in Garter’s interlude, persuaded by the false testimony of the elders, 
sentences Susanna to death. However, as “she is led to execution . . . 
God rayseth the spiritte of Danyell,” who insists that “they return all 
backe to judgment.”26 In due course, Susanna is proclaimed innocent 
and the other participants in the trial roundly condemned. Garter’s 
interlude is comforting to the extent that it portrays a caring God 
who intercedes on behalf of the downtrodden, but it certainly would 
not have left readers with much confi dence in temporal judgment. 
Daniel refers to the members of the legal community in the interlude 
as “foolish folke . . . that know not ill from good”27 – hardly an 
endorsement of the effi cacies of English common law.
Anxieties about the role of judges and the effects of their decisions 
can be found issuing from within the legal community, too. Edward 
Coke, for example, though confi dent enough that a judge would not 
completely misinterpret evidence and testimony, nevertheless urged 
those charged with the task of adjudication not to overstep their 
bounds. The role of the judge, Coke insisted, is to declare law, not to 
make it, “for that which hath been refi ned and perfected by the wisest 
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men in former succession of ages, and proved and approved by con-
tinual experience to be good and profi table for the commonwealth, 
cannot without great hazard or danger be altered or changed.”28 He 
returned to the issue in his First Institutes, noting that “commonly 
a new invention doth offend against many rules and reasons of the 
common law, and the ancient judges and sages of the law have ever 
. . . suppressed innovation and novelties in the beginning.”29 Coke 
was not the only one to weigh in on the “hazard” of judicial innova-
tion. John Davies makes a similar point in the preface to Le Primer 
Report des Cases en Ireland (1615) and Francis Bacon opens his 
essay “Of Judicature” with an extended statement on the matter:
Judges ought to remember that their offi ce is jus dicere, and not jus dare; 
to interpret law, and not to make law, or give law. Else it will be like 
the authority claimed by the church of Rome, which under pretext of 
exposition of Scripture doth not stick to add and alter; and to pronounce 
that which they do not fi nd; and by show of antiquity to introduce 
novelty. Judges ought to be more learned than witty, more reverend than 
plausible, and more advised than confi dent. Above all things, integrity is 
their portion and proper virtue.30 
Judgment, Bacon asserts, is a strain of applied scholarship, not a 
maverick performance. He urges a kind of learned modesty and 
deference to legal doctrine. As long as the laws themselves speak 
through the judge, rather than vice versa, there is minimal risk of 
corruption and error. 
The anxieties of jurists and clergymen notwithstanding, legal judg-
ment was, with few exceptions, a thoroughly collaborative affair. 
It was a process involving multiple parties. We get a sense of how 
this worked in the manuals produced for Justices of the Peace in the 
period. Essentially printed how-to guides, these manuals were aimed 
at the gentlemen charged with presiding over the Quarter Sessions – 
county courts that met four times per year (Epiphany, Easter, Trinity, 
and Michaelmas) – though they were no doubt consulted by other 
legal amateurs, too. Justices of the Peace were appointed annually 
and the primary qualifi cation for the job was local standing, not legal 
expertise. They would hear cases having to do with comparatively 
minor offenses, such as trespass, assault, licenses for alehouses, and 
theft.31 Cases involving the most serious felonies, such as murder, 
were typically heard at the Assizes, which met twice per year and 
were presided over by professional barristers from the central courts. 
Responding to a clear need among England’s many legal amateurs 
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for procedural guidance, Justice of the Peace manuals began being 
printed in the late sixteenth century and increased steadily in popu-
larity over the course of the seventeenth century. Almost all Justice of 
the Peace manuals went through multiple print runs and successive 
editions, so we can assume that they were in demand. Small books 
ranging in size from sixteenmo to octavo, they were meant to be car-
ried around and referred to while on the job or shortly beforehand. 
Accordingly, the tone and style of the Justice of the Peace manuals 
tend to be practical and concise. From the mid-seventeenth century, 
in particular, a premium seems to have been placed on usability. The 
anonymously authored The Complete Justice (1637), for example, 
simply lists alphabetically a series of key technical terms and proce-
dures followed by brief descriptions. This is a manual designed for 
quick and easy reference. The same format is adopted in The justice 
of peace, his clarks cabinet (1654), written by the prolifi c William 
Shepherd who also produced law lexicons and manuals for parsons, 
constables, and other minor legal professionals.
All of these texts show legal judgment to be a process involv-
ing various individuals working in close partnership. Take William 
Lambarde’s Eirenarcha: or the offi ce of the justices of the peace (1581). 
As an early example of the genre, Eirenarcha is more discursive and 
descriptive than its later seventeenth-century counterparts. Lambarde 
overviews the duties of Justices to their community, the central courts, 
the king, and God, and tries to differentiate between those situations 
in which strict conformity to certain recorded statutes is appropriate 
and when more discretionary judgment is called for.32 Signifi cantly, 
during the lengthy discussion of the protocols of trial and sentencing, 
Lambarde describes this “Session of the Peace” as “An assemblie,” 
and he stresses the fact that not one, but “two (or moe) Justices” must 
be present “to heare and determine” a case.33 This plurality of adjudi-
cators is essential, and “if any of them be absent,” Lambarde explains, 
“their fellow justices cannot amerce them . . . for . . . the auctoritie 
of all the Justices of the Peace at the Sessions is equall.”34 Lambarde 
goes on to describe in some detail each of the other fi gures who must 
be present for a trial to go forward and judgment to be passed: the 
“Shirife,” the “Baylifes,” and the “Juries,” which “ought to containe 
12. in number at the leaste.”35 Eirenarcha presents judgment as a par-
ticipatory “assemblie,” one in which complex bureaucratic procedures 
knit together a diverse network of both amateur and professional legal 
agents. Michael Dalton, a member of Lincoln’s Inn, stresses this point 
too, opening his manual, The Countrey Justice (1618), with a narra-
tive sketch of where the Justice of the Peace stands within the larger 
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legal hierarchy and what that position affords in terms of specifi c 
duties, obligations, and dependencies.36 
At the heart of these Justice of the Peace manuals is a fascina-
tion with breaking the legal process, especially adjudication, down 
into its most essential components. This concern with itemization 
and procedural detail can be found in other kinds of writing, too. 
Richard Bernard’s stunningly dense allegory, The Isle of Man, or, 
The legall proceedings in Man-shire against sinne (1627), is a good 
example. In this narrative, self-examination, self-management, and 
self-regulation are fi gured through the collaborative procedures of 
common law. Conscience is represented by the Judge, but this judge 
operates within a diverse cluster of Justices and other offi cials:
The Justices of Peace in the Countrie are there, and doe sit with the Judge 
and are in Commission with him. Of these some are of the Quorum, and 
of the better ranke, some are meaner Justices and take their place lower. 
The Justices of Peace in the Soule of better ranke are Science, Prudence, 
Providence, Sapience: the inferiors are Weake Wit, common Aprehension, 
and some such like.
These Justices have their Clerkes, there ready with their examina-
tions and recognizances. Justice Science, his Clerke is Discourse: Justice 
Prudence, his Clerke is Circumspection, Justice Providence, his Clerke is 
Diligence; Justice Sapience, his Clerke is Experience: Justice Weake-wit, 
his Clerke is Conceit: and Justice Common-Apprehension, his Clerke is 
onely Sense.37 
Bernard turns common law into a precise language of cognitive pro-
cess and spiritual struggle, signaling what Hutson describes as “a new 
moral confi dence . . . in the procedural detail of the Common Law.”38 
The allegory demonstrates the power of common law adjudication as 
an emblem of collaborative decision-making and as a fi gure for the 
concatenation of forces involved in moral choice.39
One thing that all the types of judgment considered here have in 
common is a fundamentally social, or at least relational, structure. In 
faculty psychology, judgment forms an evaluative interface with the 
outer world of people and things. In the rhetorical tradition, judg-
ment aims at address and response; it presupposes the presence of 
an other. Legal judgment is a distributed, participatory event. Even 
when judgment is invoked in the context of self-knowledge, as it is 
by Stephen Guazzo in his conduct book, The Civile Conversation 
(1581), it is presented as a capacity that links the individual to a 
larger scene of sociality: “The judgment which we have to know our-
selves is not ours, but we borrow it of others . . . the knowledge of 
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ourselves, dependeth of the judgment and conversation of many.”40 
To this extent, early modern judgment, in all its various intellectual 
and institutional iterations, participates in a long philosophical tra-
dition that views judging as a means of connecting the individual 
to larger collectives. This line of thought begins with Aristotle and 
the Stoics and is taken up with particular rigor in the eighteenth cen-
tury when writers like the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant formulated new ideas about the role 
of judgment in social and political life. 
Particularly infl uential was Kant’s famous argument that judging 
requires an “enlarged mentality,” a form of decision-making based 
on a combination of one’s own intuitions and the range of other pos-
sible intuitions held by those with whom you share a particular space 
or community. He describes it as “a power to judge that . . . takes 
account (a priori), in our thought, of everyone else’s way of present-
ing [something], in order as it were to compare our own judgment 
with human reason in general.”41 Hannah Arendt, Kant’s most astute 
modern interpreter, makes a similar argument: “As logic, to be sound, 
depends on the presence of the self, so judgment, to be valid, depends 
on the presence of others”; “Judging,” she continues, “is one, if not 
the most, important activity in which this sharing-the-world-with-
others comes to pass.”42 In a series of essays and lectures produced 
between 1961 and 1975, Arendt explored this link between judgment 
and collective perception at a level of nuance that surpassed any other 
twentieth-century philosopher. In this body of work, Arendt is par-
ticularly adept at drawing out the political and ethical implications 
of Kant’s theories. In her essay “The Crisis in Culture,” for example, 
she explains,
That capacity to judge is a specifi cally political ability in exactly the 
sense denoted by Kant, namely, the ability to see things not only from 
one’s own point of view but in the perspective of all those who happen to 
be present; even that judgment may be one of the fundamental abilities 
of man as a political being insofar as it enables him to orient himself in 
that public realm, in the common world.43 
Pushing this assertion further, Arendt maintains that aesthetic judg-
ment, or “taste,” should be understood in the same terms:
Taste, insofar as it, like any other judgment, appeals to common sense, 
is the very opposite of private feelings. In aesthetic no less than politi-
cal judgments, a decision is made, and although this decision is always 
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determined by a certain subjectivity, by the simple fact that each person 
occupies a place of his own from which he looks upon and judges the 
world, it also derives from the fact that the world itself is an objective 
datum, something common to all its inhabitants. 
“For judgments of taste,” Arendt concludes, “the world is the pri-
mary thing, not man, neither man’s life nor his self.”44 Arendt didn’t 
look to early modern England to develop these arguments, but she 
could have. The central idea she advances – that judgment, broadly 
conceived, is interactive and participatory – is central to the period’s 
understanding of adjudication. Shakespeare bears this out better 
than anyone. 
Shakespeare and Judgment
As even this brief overview indicates, judgment is a more protean 
phenomenon than may at fi rst appear to be the case. At once a fac-
ulty, a practice, a method, and a skill, judgment transforms as it 
migrates across the realms of psychology, rhetoric, aesthetics, law, 
religion, and philosophy. One implication of this multidimensional-
ity is that judgment is diffi cult to contain within a single analytical 
framework. Accordingly, the chapters in this volume speak from a 
range of methodological platforms and engage a variety of differ-
ent aspects of early modern culture, the history of ideas, and critical 
theory. The result, I hope, is a book that advances an intellectually 
diverse but still coherent account of the way judgment brings various 
discourses about justice, religion, beauty, selfhood, time, and perfor-
mance into contact in Shakespeare’s plays. 
The chapters in Shakespeare and Judgment have been grouped in 
such a way so as to let the complexities of these crossings emerge. 
Themed subsections denote fi elds of action and experience that 
comprise different forms of judgment (legal, aesthetic, moral, etc.), 
rather than building artifi cial walls between them. Part I, “Staging 
Judgment: Deliberation in the Plays,” presents three chapters on the 
performance of judgment in the playworld itself. Virginia Lee Strain’s 
chapter, “Preventive Justice in Measure for Measure,” considers the 
Duke’s treatment of Barnardine’s case at the end of the play. Fre-
quently grouped among Measure for Measure’s several concluding 
anomalies, Strain shows that there is, in fact, a compelling ethical 
logic to the Duke’s decision. This emerges into view when we read the 
scene in the context of “preventive justice,” a frequently overlooked 
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aspect of legal theory and practice, both in early modern studies and 
legal studies. Moving from legal history to intellectual history, Vivas-
van Soni’s “Believing in Ghosts, in Part: Judgment and Indecision in 
Hamlet” discusses the failure of modern philosophers to differentiate 
suffi ciently between decision and judgment in Hamlet, arguing for 
the centrality of the former to the play’s treatment of both time and 
subjectivity. Constance Jordan closes the section with a turn to mate-
rial and professional contexts. Her chapter, “Shakespeare’s Law and 
Plowden’s Authority,” considers how judgment in The Taming of the 
Shrew is shaped by developments in the practice of law reporting in 
the sixteenth century. 
Part II, “Audience Judgment: Deliberation in the Theater,” fea-
tures four chapters that expand the frame of reference to include 
not just the fi ctional playworld, but also the cognitive, interpretive, 
and participatory dynamics of theatrical spectatorship. Katherine B. 
Attié opens the section with a chapter called “‘Gently to hear, kindly 
to judge’: Minds at Work in Henry V.” In it, she demonstrates that 
in the case of Henry V, audience judgment is linked not to law, but 
rather to a specifi cally early modern understanding of the intellectual 
and ethical labor of playgoing itself, one that runs counter to the 
famous antitheatrical equivalence between theatrical spectatorship 
and idleness. Carolyn Sale’s chapter, “‘Practis[ing] judgment with 
the disposition of natures’: Measure for Measure, the ‘Discoursive’ 
Common Law, and the ‘Open Court’ of the Theater,” shifts the 
discussion from labor back to law. Focusing on Measure for Mea-
sure, she argues that the play in performance offers audiences the 
opportunity to experience their own authority in relation to the 
common law’s “discoursive” practices of judgment. Paul Yachnin 
takes us deeper into this play in his chapter, “The Laws of Mea-
sure for Measure.” Like Strain in the previous section, Yachnin is 
interested in the apparent strangeness of the Duke’s judgments in 
Act 5. But whereas Strain explains it by reference to the history and 
theory of preventive justice in early modern England, Yachnin views it 
as an example of the law-making capacity of Shakespeare’s theatrical 
art. By defamiliarizing legal judgment in institutional and historical 
terms, Measure for Measure creates its own legal system. That is to 
say, it opens a participatory space within the theater where playgoers 
can engage in the sort of collective evaluation and moral decision that 
gives meaning and value to the world. Kevin Curran concludes the 
section with a chapter called “Prospero’s Plea: Judgment, Invention, 
and Political Form in The Tempest.” Curran shows, fi rst, that the 
connection Prospero establishes between judgment and invention in 
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the epilogue grows out of early modern rhetorical theory. He then 
goes on to argue that in translating this tradition into the language of 
performance, the epilogue makes a uniquely theatrical contribution 
to a modern body of thought on the relationship between judgment, 
politics, and form. 
The fi nal section of the volume, “The Ethics of Judgment,” 
opens out to a broader set of historical and conceptual questions. 
Featuring three very different kinds of inquiries, the section offers 
a wide-ranging meditation on how judgment indexes the larger 
religious, philosophical, and critical contexts for the way social 
and moral value is determined. John Parker’s “Antinomian Shake-
speare: English Drama and Confession across the Reformation 
Divide” explores how Shakespeare tends to fi gure forgiveness as 
an escape from legal and moral judgment. Shakespeare’s skepti-
cism about judgment, Parker argues, follows from Christianity’s 
ongoing and sometimes quite radical critique of the law. Sanford 
Budick’s rigorously philosophical chapter, “Bracketed Judgment, 
‘Un-humanizing’, and Conversion in The Merchant of Venice,” 
refl ects on the way Shakespeare uses judgment in the trial scene to 
create an impossible moral dilemma, one that actually suspends the 
audience’s own ability to judge. Though at fi rst glance paradoxical, 
Budick shows through careful philosophical contextualization that 
this suspension of judgment is in fact one of the play’s most power-
ful and systemic ways of creating human community. Concluding 
the section, and the volume, is Richard Strier’s chapter, “The Judg-
ment of the Critics that Makes us Tremble: ‘Distributing Complici-
ties’ in Recent Criticism of King Lear.” In a move that will leave 
many readers refl ecting not just on Shakespeare’s plays, but also 
on their own professional practice, Strier steps outside of staged 
fi ctions, outside of the theater, and outside of early modern culture 
to consider instead the kind of judgment exercised in the world 
of Shakespeare criticism. Focusing on Stanley Cavell’s and Harry 
Berger Jr.’s infl uential work on King Lear, Strier argues for a mode 
of literary-critical judgment based on surface rather than depth and 
on common sense rather than convolution. Judgment, he reminds 
us, is not just an instinctive response, but a deliberate craft involv-
ing stylistic and hermeneutic choice. If we want literary criticism 
to have real intellectual and ethical purchase, we need to think 
carefully about how that craft is practiced. 
My hope for this volume is that it will offer readers new ways to 
frame the historical and intellectual contexts of Shakespeare’s plays, 
such that neglected areas of conceptual overlap begin to emerge. 
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Rooted as it is in so many different aspects of cultural practice and 
philosophical speculation, judgment stands to make a uniquely gen-
erative contribution to Shakespeare studies by opening new spaces of 
encounter among early modernists working with law, religion, rheto-
ric, theater history, and critical theory.
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